摘要 :
In this paper I propose a form of free will fallibilism. Unlike the free will realist who is fully persuaded that we have sufficient evidence of freedom to justify holding individuals morally responsible for what they do and impos...
展开
In this paper I propose a form of free will fallibilism. Unlike the free will realist who is fully persuaded that we have sufficient evidence of freedom to justify holding individuals morally responsible for what they do and imposing punishment, and unlike the free will skeptic who is fully persuaded that we do not have enough evidence to believe that we face a future of open alternatives, the free will fallibilist will believe that we have enough evidence to justify a belief in freedom for some purposes but not for others. Along the way I argue that deliberation-compatibilism of the sort recently defended by Pereboom is subject to a very familiar sort of counterexample. The question that concerns me the most is whether punishment-this brutal institution that disposes of the lives of countless of our most vulnerable citizens-can be justified. I think it cannot, precisely because there is not sufficient evidence that human beings are free to choose between branching alternatives and so deserve to be treated like that. At least, if there is such justifying evidence it is more or less completely balanced by evidence that all events including human actions have causes. Moreover, I find compatibilism utterly unpersuasive. At the same time, I believe that I am a free agent; what I do is in large part up to me. I believe that the explanation of action cannot be reduced to causal explanation, and I believe that the logic of action requires a notion of branching time. I have two pictures of the universe; which of the two pictures I may rely upon will depend upon just what it is that I intend to do. Between the problem that preoccupies me, punishment, and my day-to-day choices (whether to have another cup of coffee, for example), there is a wide gap. There are a lot of choices that, on the axis of justification, fall in between the two, many of them choices about how to treat those around us: whether to snub a friend who has insulted me, whether to castigate her, whether to reward a kind act with praise. Where to draw the line is a topic for another paper. The only principle that right now seems to me firm enough to act upon is this: the greater the likelihood of doing harm, the less likely the choice is to be justified.
收起
摘要 :
Human free will is a product of evolution and contributes to the success of the human animal. Useful robots will also require free will of a similar kind, and we will have to design it into them. Free will is not an all-or-nothing...
展开
Human free will is a product of evolution and contributes to the success of the human animal. Useful robots will also require free will of a similar kind, and we will have to design it into them. Free will is not an all-or-nothing thing. Some agents have more free will, or free will of different kinds, than others, and we will try to analyse this phenomenon. Our objectives are primarily technological, i.e. to study what aspects of free will can make robots more useful, and we will not try to console those who find determinism distressing. We distinguish between having choices and being conscious of these choices; both are important, even for robots, and consciousness of choices requires more structure in the agent than just having choices and is important for robots. Consciousness of free will is therefore not just an epiphenomenon of structure serving other purposes. Free will does not require a very complex system. Young children and rather simple computer systems can represent internally ‘I can, but I won't' and behave accordingly. Naturally I hope this detailed design stance will help understand human free will. It takes the compatibilist philosophical position. There may be some readers interested in what the paper says about human free will and who are put off by logical formulas. The formulas are not important for the arguments about human free will; they are present for people contemplating AI systems using mathematical logic. They can skip the formulas, but the coherence of what remains is not absolutely guaranteed.
收起
摘要 :
Is epiphenomenalism virtually entailed by the current empirical knowledge about how the mind/brain causes human behavior? I'll address this question by highlighting that recent discoveries in empirical psychology and neuroscience ...
展开
Is epiphenomenalism virtually entailed by the current empirical knowledge about how the mind/brain causes human behavior? I'll address this question by highlighting that recent discoveries in empirical psychology and neuroscience actually do not strike the final blow to the notions of free will and intentional agency. Indeed, most of the experiments that purport to show that our behavior is unconscious and automatic do not prove that it is indeed the case and that therefore we do not have free will. There are many reasons for this, including the fact that those experiments focus on a specific range of our behavior, one that manifests a significant correlation between unconscious priming and decisions or reactions. However, this doesn't mean that the entire range of our relevant behavior works the same way. It can be argued that there are situations of higher relevance in which we are fully conscious of our decisions or, at least, there are decisions such that psychological experiments cannot prove them to always be unconscious and automatic. However, the epiphenomenalist challenge may suggest that we should abandon some of the suppositions implied by a traditional idea of free will.
收起
摘要 :
Background and objectives: To which extent is a perpetrator responsible for an offense when he has (or not) consumed alcohol remains subject to conflicting results. Methods: In this study, participants (n = 162) were randomly aske...
展开
Background and objectives: To which extent is a perpetrator responsible for an offense when he has (or not) consumed alcohol remains subject to conflicting results. Methods: In this study, participants (n = 162) were randomly asked to sentence a perpetrator for an assault in a nightclub (mild) and spousal violence (severe). In each case, the perpetrator was either sober or had consumed alcohol. Results: Our results show that participants judge the perpetrator less severely when he was an alcohol user, but only when the seriousness of the offense is mild. In both cases, the more participants believed in Free Will, the harsher the sentence. Conclusions and scientific significance: Methodological and implications of how individuals' beliefs may bias legal decisions are discussed.
收起
摘要 :
‘‘The perfection of a science is shown in the perfectionof its language,’’ Condillac said in 1746.1 A conceptthat is gaining in popularity and cropping up inscientific articles with increasing regularity is ‘‘compulsivity.’...
展开
‘‘The perfection of a science is shown in the perfectionof its language,’’ Condillac said in 1746.1 A conceptthat is gaining in popularity and cropping up inscientific articles with increasing regularity is ‘‘compulsivity.’’Off the cuff, the word ‘‘compulsive’’ makesus think of something that is controlled, repeated,inexorable, repetitive, imperative, stereotyped, andnecessary—something you ‘‘have to’’ do. Compulsivityis associated with addiction, obsessive–compulsivedisorder, paraphilia, obesity, anorexia, bulimia, hoarding,pathological buying and gambling, kleptomania,body dysmorphic disorder, trichotillomania, etc.
收起
摘要 :
Is epiphenomenalism virtually entailed by the current empirical knowledge about how the mind/brain causes human behavior? I’ll address this question by highlighting that recent discoveries in empirical psychology and neuroscience...
展开
Is epiphenomenalism virtually entailed by the current empirical knowledge about how the mind/brain causes human behavior? I’ll address this question by highlighting that recent discoveries in empirical psychology and neuroscience actually do not strike the final blow to the notions of free will and intentional agency. Indeed, most of the experiments that purport to show that our behavior is unconscious and automatic do not prove that it is indeed the case and that therefore we do not have free will. There are many reasons for this, including the fact that those experiments focus on a specific range of our behaviour, one that manifests a significant correlation between unconscious priming and decisions or reactions. However, this doesn’t mean that the entire range of our relevant behavior works the same way. It can be argued that there are situations of higher relevance in which we are fully conscious of our decisions or, at least, there are decisions such that psychological experiments cannot prove them to always be unconscious and automatic. However, the epiphenomenalist challenge may suggest that we should abandon some of the suppositions implied by a traditional idea of free will.
收起
摘要 :
This paper provides a discussion and defense of a recent formulation of the idea that moral responsibility for actions depends on the capacity to respond to reasons. This formulation appears in several publications by John Martin ...
展开
This paper provides a discussion and defense of a recent formulation of the idea that moral responsibility for actions depends on the capacity to respond to reasons. This formulation appears in several publications by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, where the authors argue that moral responsibility involves a kind of control over one’s actions which they call “guidance control.” This kind of control does not require an agent’s ability to do something different from what he actually does, but instead requires only that the actual process leading to the action be responsive in some suitable way to the reasons that the agent has for acting. After summarizing this view, I offer the following two innovations to the authors’ view: I argue that the level of control required for moral responsibility (which I call “regular reasons-responsiveness”) is much stronger than what the author’s view allows for; and 2) I give a common-sense account of the kinds of motivational mechanism relevant to moral responsibility. Given these innovations, I show that this kind of view allows us to easily answer some counterexamples that appear in the current literature on moral responsibility.
收起
摘要 :
Recently it has been claimed that no extension of quantum theory can have improved predictive power, the statement following, according to the authors, from the assumptions of free will and of the correctness of quantum prediction...
展开
Recently it has been claimed that no extension of quantum theory can have improved predictive power, the statement following, according to the authors, from the assumptions of free will and of the correctness of quantum predictions concerning the correlations of measurement outcomes. Here we prove that the argument is basically flawed by an inappropriate use of the assumption of free will. In particular, among other implications, the claim, if correct, would imply that Bohmian Mechanics is incompatible with free will. This statement, appearing in the paper, derives from the unjustified identification of free will with the no-signaling constraint and of a purely formal and not physical use of such a constraint.
收起
摘要 :
In this essay, I respond to Nick Trakakis’ “A Third (Meta-)Critique.” This critique is directed against my argument concerning the inadequacy of the traditional theistic argument from free will. I contend that the argument from...
展开
In this essay, I respond to Nick Trakakis’ “A Third (Meta-)Critique.” This critique is directed against my argument concerning the inadequacy of the traditional theistic argument from free will. I contend that the argument from free will does not adequately explain the distribution of moral evil in the world. I maintain that the third critique, like Trakakis’ earlier critiques, is unconvincing. I remain convinced that my original argument regarding the inadequacy of the traditional argument from free will is compelling. The argument from freedom of the will, considered in itself, is unpersuasive.
收起
原文获取